When we talk about an Alliance with a capital A, what we are referring to is the link between Renault and Nissan. At least, this is how the group would like to be known - and there is little reason to begrudge the legitimacy of this wish. In the late 1990s, globalisation’s penchant for giganticism accelerated, spurring carmakers into a renewed bout of strategic manœuvring. Three major international-level agreements were signed at this time, between Daimler-Chrysler, General Motors-Fiat and Renault-Nissan.

The first tie-up turned out to be more of an absorption of the US carmaker by its German partner than the announced merger. Chrysler was severely affected by these events, with DaimlerChrysler also struggling to benefit from the new structure. Moreover, the future of the Smart car remains uncertain. The two groups’ ostensible complementarity has been diluted.

The second pact has fallen apart and created a dynamic that is harming both partners. Fiat is in a sorry state, and the world financial markets were hit by GM’s recent (March) announcement of lower profits. Redundancy problems involving Fiat, Opel and even Suzuki have yet to be resolved.

What a contrast with Nissan’s remarkable recovery and Renault’s healthy financial situation. These two brands have benefited fully from their geographic complementarity and already started to develop shared platforms for their high volume models – with each partner continuing to respect the other’s identity and specificity.

Without being the harbingers of bad news, we do wonder, however, whether the good news about the Alliance isn’t already a thing of the past. Questions have been raised about the durability of this structure. On one hand, the major rationalisation efforts that were engaged at Nissan immediately after the arrival of Carlos Ghosn and its team, relating in particular to the firm’s suppliers, have already had their positive effects; the negative side is appearing (Cf. Lettre n°182 Editorial). In other words, these opportunities have already been seized, and there is little more to be gained in this respect, i.e., this success will be difficult to repeat. It is hard to remain mobilised over the long run, given the type of organisational dynamic that this necessitates. We are also awaiting the markets’ reactions to the cars currently being built on the shared platforms. In the past, many projects that seemed attractive on paper ultimately led to disillusionment. In the end, consumers will be responsible for validating this strategy. In short, we would do well not to underestimate the magnitude of the problems faced in ensuring the Alliance’s long-term survival. There is no historical precedent at this level, whether in the automobile industry or any other sector. Long-term survival means inventing a new business model and not just relying on a providential leader. In running both Nissan and Renault, Carlos Ghosn will be assuming a twofold responsibility, thereby embodying what would apppear to be a new type of entrepreneur. At a deeper level, if the challenges awaiting this business are to be overcome, consideration will have to be given to other components of its organisational dynamic, something that GERPISA apprehends through the shaping of a company government compromise.