The publication of Ford and GM‘s 2005 accounts has once
again demonstrated how crucial captive financing is to carmakers’
survival. Without Ford Credit, Ford would have posted nearly
$4 billion in losses instead of $2 billion in net profits.
Similarly, without GMAC, GM would have lost more than $11
billion instead of $8.6 billion.
All of which makes GM’s current attempt to sell off
its majority stake in GMAC.1 All the
more surprising, this shock decision is a reflection of the
American automobile groups’ very poor stock market performance,
and more specifically of the downgrading of the debt they
have mainly accumulated in their financial subsidiaries’
names. Standard & Poor’s has assigned a BB rating
to debt that was first issued by Ford and GM and later by
Ford Credit and GMA,2 giving it something
akin to junk bond status. Because of the very high costs that
captive finance companies are being asked to pay to access
the financial resources they need to refinance their outstanding
loans, this development has undermined their competitiveness.
What analysts have deduced from this is that captive finance
companies need to dissociate themselves from their carmaker
parents and offer majority stakes to banks, the only institutions
capable of improving their debt ratings.
If this were to happen, as appears likely at GM at least,
we will be witnessing a major shift in the automobile industry.
Not only are the aforementioned financial subsidiaries sources
of profits, but since the 1920s they have also comprised key
constituents of carmakers’ market power.3
By turning its back on this business, GM is depriving itself
not only of the support that a captive finance company can
offer the Group’s car sales activities but also of the
means to control its dealers, a role that GM is not given
under American law but which it assumes when acting as the
dealers’ banker. Preferring S&P to Chandler, Wagoner
also means forgetting Sloan, who from the very outset had
realised how crucial this lever can be in activating the “invisible
hand”.
_______________
1. According to The Wall Street Journal
dated 16/02/06, a group led by the hedge fund Cerberus Capital
Management and a Citigroup subsidiary have taken the inside
lane in negotiations concerning the acquisition of a controlling
stake in General Motors Acceptance Corp (GMAC). The sums evoked
range from $10 to 15 billion.
2. Re: GMAC, see The Financial Times
dated 24/10/05. For Ford, see La Tribune dated 24/01/06.
3. On this subject, see an excellent
paper by S. Clarke, called “Closing the deal: GM’s
marketing dilemma and its franchised dealers, 1921-1941”,
Business History, special issue The emergence of modern marketing,
volume 45, I, January 2003, pages 60-79.